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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A
CRIMINAL, DEFENDANT'S HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED
TESTIMONY-Rock v. Arkansas
INTRODUCTION
The mention of hypnosis often evokes thoughts of a wizard-
like hypnotist wielding evil powers over his subject. Soothsayers,
magicians, witches, and priests utilized hypnosis thousands of
years ago.1 In 1958, the American medical community accepted
hypnosis as a valid therapeutic technique for the treatment of vari-
ous illnesses and addictions.2 Based upon the medical community's
increased use and acceptance of hypnosis, law enforcement agen-
cies turn to hypnosis as a method of refreshing the recollection of a
witness or victim who is experiencing difficulty in recalling the
events or details surrounding a particular crime.3 However, certain
risks associated with hypnosis may affect the reliability of a wit-
ness's testimony when that witness has been previously hypnotized
for the purpose of enhancing memory.4
Because of inherent risks associated with hypnosis, the judicial
system has wrestled for the past twenty years with the issue of
whether a witness should be allowed to testify at trial after being
hypnotized to refresh recollection. Courts have adopted one of
three approaches when faced with the issue of hypnotically re-
freshed testimony: the per se admissible approach, the procedural
safeguards approach, or the per se inadmissible approach. Courts
following the per se admissible approach hold that hypnosis only
affects credibility of the testimony, not admissibility, and permit a
previously hypnotized witness to testify at trial. This approach
1. Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 174 (1902).
2. Council on Scientific Affairs: Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection
by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 J.A.M.A. 1918 (1985).
3. Sies, Judicial Approaches to the Question of Admissibility of Hypnoti-
cally Refreshed Testimony: A History and Analysis, 35 DE PAUL L. REV. 77, 83
(1985).
4. Ruffra, Hypnotically Induced Testimony: Should It Be Admitted?, 19
CRIM. L. BULL. 293, 295-97 (1983).
5. See, e.g., Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974)
(plaintiff sued helicopter manufacturer and underwent hypnosis to refresh his
memory, which had been impaired by the crash); Connally v. Farmer, 484 F.2d
456 (5th Cir. 1973) (the first reported civil case in which a court admitted a plain-
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views the challenged testimony as a present recollection of past
events refreshed by hypnosis.'
Courts which adhere to the procedural safeguards approach
recognize problems associated with hypnosis that may affect the
reliability of a witness's later testimony.7 Because these courts view
procedural safeguards as reducing dangers inherent in the hypnotic
process, they allow a previously hypnotized witness to testify if
certain procedures were followed during the hypnotic process.'
Courts advocating the procedural safeguards approach believe that
rendering hypnotically refreshed testimony inadmissible may re-
sult in the loss of important, reliable evidence.9
Finally, courts adopting the per se inadmissible approach hold
that hypnotically refreshed testimony is inadmissible. 10 These
courts preclude the admission of hypnotically induced testimony
because of problems associated with hypnosis."
In Rock v. Arkansas,2 the United States Supreme Court an-
swered the question of whether a court should admit a criminal
defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony. The Court held that
tiff's hypnotically refreshed testimony); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379,
385 N.E.2d 848 (1979) (murder case in which the principal witness stated prior to
hypnosis that there was only a "50-50 chance" that the defendant was the person
she had seen commit the murders); State v. Brom, 8 Or. App. 598, 494 P.2d 434
(1972) (where the court admitted a witness's testimony where that witness's am-
nesia was cured by hypnosis and sodium amytal).
6. See Harding v. Maryland, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968).
7. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
8. Dr. Martin Orne originally proposed a set of procedural safeguards to re-
duce risks associated with hypnosis that may affect the reliability of subsequent
testimony. See Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L. J.
CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 335-36 (1979).
9. State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 527, 319 S.E.2d 177, 184 (1984).
10. See State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981).
11. Several characteristics related to hypnosis may cause subsequent testi-
mony to be unreliable. First, hypnosis is characterized as a state of heightened
suggestibility. Because of subtle cues the hypnotist gives to the subject, the sub-
ject may recall as his own recollections the hypnotist's suggestions. A subject who
realizes the importance of solving a crime may attempt to please the hypnotist
with answers the subject knows will be met with approval. Because of this desire
to please, the subject may "confabulate," or fill in gaps in his memory. In addi-
tion, a subject may intentionally lie during hypnosis or feign a hypnotic trance.
The extent of the accuracy of hypnotically refreshed memories is difficult to as-
certain because of "post-hypnotic source amnesia," or the subject's inability to
differentiate between pre- and post-hypnotic memories. Ruffra, supra note 4, at
295-97.
12. 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
[Vol. 10:311
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Arkansas's evidentiary rule, which precluded the admission of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony, violated a criminal defendant's con-
stitutional right to testify on her own behalf at trial. 3 The Court
stated that the procedural safeguards approach was the proper ap-
proach for lower courts to employ when a criminal defendant testi-
fies after undergoing hypnosis to refresh recollection."
This Note discusses the nature and history of hypnosis and
supports the Rock Court's holding as the correct approach. The
procedural safeguards approach decreases risks associated with
hypnosis that may adversely affect the reliability of a defendant's
subsequent testimony and protects a defendant's constitutional
right to testify in her own behalf. This approach allows a court to
admit hypnotically enhanced testimony where there are indices
that the testimony is reliable and advances our judicial system's
search for the truth.
THE CASE
On July 2, 1983, Vickie Lorene Rock was charged with man-
slaughter in the death of her husband, Frank Rock.15 The couple
had been involved in a disagreement over Mr. Rock's desire to
move to a trailer outside of town. 6 When police officers arrived at
the home, they discovered Mr. Rock lying on the floor with a bullet
wound in his chest. Mrs. Rock appeared extremely agitated and
begged police officers to save her husband's life. She related to po-
13. Id. at 2714-15.
14. Id. at 2714. The Rock Court stated:
A State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not ex-
tend to per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case.
Wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary re-
striction on the right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the
State repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis recollections. The State
would be well within its powers if it established guidelines to aid trial
courts in the evaluation of posthypnosis testimony and it may be able to
show that testimony in a particular case is so unreliable that exclusion is
justified. But it has not shown that hypnotically enhanced testimony is
always so untrustworthy and so immune to the traditional means of eval-
uating credibility that it should disable a defendant from presenting her
version of the events for which she is on trial.
Id.
15. Id. at 2706.
16. Id. During the evening of July 2, 1983, Mr. Rock prevented his wife from
eating some pizza and leaving their apartment, and a fight ensued. Id.
1988]
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lice officers conflicting versions of how the shooting occurred.1"
Because Mrs. Rock could not recall the exact details of the
shooting, her attorney suggested that she undergo hypnosis to re-
fresh her recollection.18 Dr. Betty Back, a licensed neuropsycholo-
gist with training in the field of hypnosis, hypnotized Mrs. Rock on
two occasions.1 9 Dr. Back interviewed Mrs. Rock for one hour prior
to the first hypnotic session and took notes on her general history
and recollection of the shooting. Dr. Back also recorded both hyp-
notic sessions on tape.20
During the hypnotic sessions, Mrs. Rock divulged no new or
additional information from that which she had given the police;
however, after being hypnotized, Mrs. Rock recalled that, at the
time of the shooting, she held her thumb on the hammer of the
gun but did not hold her finger on the trigger.21 She related that
the gun discharged when her husband grabbed her arm.22 Based on
this information, Mrs. Rock's attorney engaged a gun expert to ex-
amine the gun. After examining the gun, the expert ascertained
that the gun was defective and prone to fire if hit or dropped,
without the trigger being pulled.23
The prosecutor filed a motion to exclude Mrs. Rock's testi-
mony when he learned of the hypnotic sessions. The trial judge
held a hearing on the motion and issued an order limiting the de-
fendant's testimony to facts she remembered and related before
Dr. Back hypnotized her.2" At trial, the defendant introduced the
gun expert's testimony. However, the trial court limited the de-
fendant's own testimony to her recitation of the facts contained in
Dr. Back's sketchy, handwritten notes taken before the hypnotic
17. One of the investigating officers testified that Mrs. Rock told him that
her husband grabbed her, choked her, and threw her against a wall, and that she
picked up the weapon and pointed it toward the floor. She shot Mr. Rock after he
hit her a second time. Id. Another officer reported a different version of events
related by Mrs. Rock. This officer stated that Mrs. Rock told him her husband
prevented her from going outside and began choking her. She grabbed a gun and
threatened her husband to leave her alone. The gun misfired when Mr. Rock
struck her. Id. at n.1.
18. Id. at 2706.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2706-07.
21. Id. at 2707.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
[Vol. 10:311
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss2/5
HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY
sessions.2 5 A jury convicted the defendant of manslaughter, and
the defendant received a prison sentence of ten years and a
$10,000 fine. 6
The Arkansas Supreme Court adopted an evidentiary rule of
per se inadmissibility which precluded the admission of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony at trial.2 7 The court recognized a defend-
ant's constitutional right to testify but stated that any "prejudice
or deprivation" 28 the defendant experienced "was minimal and re-
sulted from her own actions and not by any erroneous ruling of the
court.29 The United States Supreme Court deliberated over the
constitutionality of Arkansas's exclusionary rule prohibiting admis-
sion of a defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony at trial and
held that Arkansas's ruling violated a criminal defendant's consti-
tutional right to testify on her own behalf.3 0
BACKGROUND
A. History of Hypnosis
Earliest recorded history indicates that medical and psycho-
logical researchers studied the practice of hypnosis.31 Over fifty
centuries ago, Assyrian and Babylonian priests used hypnosis to
treat various illnesses. Practitioners in Egyptian sleep temples em-
ployed hypnosis as a regular form of therapy thirty centuries ago.
Doctors and medicine men practiced hypnosis in ancient India, Af-
rica, and pre-Columbian America.32
During the middle ages in Christian Europe, people regarded
hypnosis as an evil power and considered hypnotists to be agents
of the devil victimizing helpless subjects with bizarre spells.33
Franz Mesmer, a Viennese physician living in Paris during the
18th century, attempted to establish hypnosis as a science or
25. Id.
26. Rock v. Arkansas, 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d 78 (1986), vacated and re-
manded, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987).
27. Id. at 570, 708 S.W.2d at 80.
28. Id. at 580, 708 S.W.2d at 85.
29. Id., 708 S.W.2d at 86.
30. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2714-15. The Rock Court stated, "Arkan-
sas' per se rule excluding all posthypnosis testimony infringes impermissibly on
the right of a defendant to testify on his or her own behalf." Id.
31. Comment, Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony in Criminal Trials: Cur-
rent Trends and Rationales, 19 Hous. L. REV. 765 (1982).
32. Sies, supra note 3, at 82.
33. Id.
1988]
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pseudo-science. Dr. Mesmer created a theory and practice of medi-
cal therapy known as "animal magnetism." He opined that all real-
ity was filled with an invisible fluid and that illness was caused by
an imbalance of fluid in the body. Dr. Mesmer maintained that he
could cure illnesses by increasing the flow of magnetic fluids in the
body by using magnets and performing an elaborate ritual. 4 An
investigatory commission of the French government condemned
Dr. Mesmer and his practices, and the practice of hypnosis fell into
disrepute."
Additional research and experimentation during the next cen-
tury contributed to the usage, understanding, and legitimacy of
hypnosis.36 In 1958, the American Medical Association recognized
the use of hypnosis by adequately trained physicians and psycholo-
gists.3 7 Today, physicians and psychologists use hypnosis to treat
various illnesses and addictions, such as smoking, asthma, burns,
chronic pain, grief, impotency, obesity, migraine and tension head-
aches, and warts.3 8
B. Nature of Hypnosis
No generally accepted theory of hypnosis exists. Authorities
have never reached a consensus regarding a single definition of
hypnosis.3 9 Simply defined, hypnosis is "an artificially induced
sleeplike condition in which an individual is extremely responsive
to suggestions made by the hypnotist."4 0 Despite disagreement on
34. Id. Mesmer ensconced groups of his patients around a large tub of water
filled with glass and iron filings. Mesmer touched iron rods protruding from the
tub to afflicted parts of a patient's anatomy. Mesmer appeared in a darkened
room wearing silk robes and magnetized the tub with a touch of his hand, creating
"convulsive crises" in his patients. See Comment, The Admissibility of Hypnoti-
cally Refreshed Testimony, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 224 n.10 (1984).
35. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Pro-
spective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313, 318 (1980). Authorities consider Professor
Diamond to be a leading expert on hypnosis and the legal ramifications of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony.
36. Sies, supra note 3, at 82.
37. Council on Scientific Affairs: Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection
by the Use of Hypnosis, supra note 2, at 1918.
38. Comment, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Induced Recollection, 70
Ky. L.J. 187, 189 n.18 (1981-1982).
39. Council on Scientific Affairs: Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection
by the Use of Hypnosis, supra note 2, at 1919.
40. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 648
(1980).
[Vol. 10:311
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technical points, most authorities agree that hypnosis requires su-
perficial cooperation of the subject, the development of rapport be-
tween the subject and hypnotist, and the subject's focus of atten-
tion.41 Usually, the hypnotist carries out some form of an induction
procedure or "ceremony" to induce hypnosis. After the induction
procedure, the subject becomes increasingly responsive to explicit
or implicit suggestions of the hypnotist or someone designated by
the hypnotist. During this process, the hypnotist encourages the
subject to suspend critical judgment and accept rather than ques-
tion suggestions given."2
Even though investigative agencies of police departments in-
creasingly utilize hypnosis for investigative purposes and for en-
hancement of a witness's memory,43 certain risks associated with
hypnosis may affect the reliability of a witness's subsequent testi-
mony. Researchers characterize hypnosis as a state of heightened
suggestibility." Frequently, the subject of hypnosis understands
the nature of a case and the importance of solving a crime, particu-
larly where the subject is the victim of the crime. During the hyp-
notic experience, the subject may create false memories resulting
from a desire to please the hypnotist or law enforcement person-
nel.' 5 In addition, a subject may create false memories due to the
expectations of appropriate behavior for hypnotized individuals or
due to a ready acceptance of the hypnotist's deliberate suggestions
or inadvertent cues." Furthermore, the subject may confabulate or
fill in memory gaps with logical deductions of what should have
happened. 7 As a defense, the subject may produce fantasies
known as "screen memories" to prevent the retrieval of real but
traumatic memories. 48
41. Council on Scientific Affairs: Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollection
by the Use of Hypnosis, supra note 2, at 1919.
42. Id.
43. Hypnosis may provide a means of helping a witness or victim of a crime
recover lost or repressed memories. Often, physical or emotional trauma causes
various degrees of amnesia or psychological blocking of memory. Also, the passage
of time frequently erodes memory. Sies, supra note 3, at 84.
44. Id. at 85.
45. Kroger and Douce, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation, 27 INT'L. J.
CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 358, 366 (1979).
46. Id.
47. Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 OHIO
N.U.L.REv. 1, 4-5 (1977).
48. See generally, Kroger and Douce, Forensic Uses of Hypnosis, 23 AM. J.
CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS, 86-93 (1980).
1988] 317
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Another risk reported by researchers is that hypnotized indi-
viduals express greater confidence in the recall of details following
hypnosis than individuals who were never hypnotized.49 This factor
precludes cross-examination from being used as an effective
method to test credibility. In addition, the extent of the accuracy
of hypnotically refreshed memories is difficult to ascertain because
of "post-hypnotic source amnesia," or the subject's inability to dis-
tinguish between pre- and post-hypnotic memories. 0 Finally, a
subject may feign a hypnotic trance and deceive highly trained
hypnotists5' or willingly lie during a deep hypnotic trance.52
C. Case History
Three lines of decision have emerged because of problems with
hypnosis that may adversely affect the reliability of hypnotically
induced testimony. In the 1968 case of Harding v. State," a court
for the first time dealt with the use of hypnosis as a means of re-
freshing a witness's recollection. In Harding, a clinical psychologist
hypnotized a rape and assault victim for the purpose of refreshing
the victim's memory of events surrounding the crime. 4 During the
trial, the victim stated she was testifying from her own present rec-
ollection; the hypnotist testified as an expert witness and declared
that the hypnotic process which he used was generally reliable and
not unduly suggestive.55 The court allowed the testimony to be ad-
mitted but cautioned the jury against giving the hypnotized Wit-
ness's testimony more weight than they would give to other testi-
mony.56 The Harding court held that testimony resulting from
hypnosis affects credibility but not the testimony's admissibility. 57
This ruling set a trend followed by other state and federal courts. 8
49. Buckhout, Eugenio, Licitra, Oliver, and Kramer, Memory, Hypnosis, and
Evidence: Research on Eyewitnesses, 7 Soc. ACT. AND L. 67, 68 (1981).
50. Diamond, supra note 35, at 335-36.
51. Id. at 336-37.
52. Orne, supra note 8, at 313.
53. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968).
54. Id. at 234, 246 A.2d at 305. C
55. Id. at 236, 240, 246 A.2d at 306, 308. The hypnotist stated, "In my own
experience, I seriously doubt suggestibility in the way we think of, in that you
have an influence and the person subjects himself to your influence." Id. at 240,
246 A.2d at 308.
56. Id. at 244, 246 A.2d at 310.
57. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
58. See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975);
Wyler v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
318 [Vol. 10:311
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The courts which followed Harding viewed hypnotically re-
freshed testimony as a witness's present recollection of events re-
freshed by hypnosis. Under Harding, the underlying rationale for
admissibility is that with the use of traditional legal devices, such
as cross-examination, expert testimony regarding problems associ-
ated with hypnosis, and cautionary instructions, a jury will give the
proper weight to the evidence. Following Harding, several courts
expressed concern over the jury's ability to assess accurately the
credibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony.59 These courts
adopted the procedural safeguards approach as the correct ap-
proach for trial courts to follow when confronted with the question
of the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony. Under the
procedural safeguards approach, the trial judge must make an ini-
tial ruling on the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony
by determining whether the hypnotist followed certain procedural
safeguards which are designed to protect against the danger of un-
reliability associated with hypnotically enhanced testimony.60 The
New Jersey Supreme Court case of State v. Hurd" epitomized the
procedural safeguards approach.
In Hurd, the court advocated six procedural safeguards that
the hypnotist must comply with during the hypnotic process before
the trial judge will admit the testimony: the hypnotist must be a
qualified psychiatrist or psychologist; the hypnotist should be in-
dependent of either side involved in the litigation; all information
given to the hypnotist prior to the hypnotic session must be re-
corded; the subject must describe the facts as he remembers them
to the hypnotist prior to hypnosis; all contact between the subject
and hypnotist must be recorded, preferably on videotape; and no
person, other than the hypnotist and subject, should be present
during any contact between the two.6 2 The Hurd court imposed
Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); People v. Colligan, 91 Cal. App. 3d
846, 154 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1979); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240
(1974); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); Pearson v.
State, 441 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. 1982); State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1980); State
v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S.
1027 (1981); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v.
Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983); State v. Bram, 8 Or. App. 598, 494 P.2d 434
(1972); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); Chapman v.
State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).
59. Ruffra, supra note 4, at 299.
60. Id.
61. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
62. Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
19881 319
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these guidelines to guard against undue suggestiveness during the
hypnotic process. Subsequent cases have followed the procedures
delineated in Hurd or developed similar guidelines. 3
Finally, other courts adopted the rule of per se inadmissibility
and precluded the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony."
These courts expressed concern over risks associated with hypnosis
that may adversely affect the reliability of subsequent testimony65
and believed that procedural safeguards were inadequate in ame-
liorating this unreliability.6 6 In ruling that hypnosis as a scientific
means of refreshing recollection is unreliable, these courts deter-
mined that the scientific community has not acknowledged hypno-
sis as a generally reliable method of refreshing recollection to the
63. See, e.g., Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986); House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815 (Miss.
1984); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M. App. 1981), writ
quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 (1982); State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279,
475 N.E.2d 805 (1984); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W. 2d 386,
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983).
64. See, e.g., Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986) (consolidated
petitions where a victim of kidnapping and sexual assault was hypnotized to iden-
tify her attacker; another victim, who was shot after she discovered a burglar in
her apartment, was hypnotized to identify her attacker); State ex rel. Collins v.
Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982) (where police investigators
hypnotize an individual, any corroborating evidence subsequently obtained is ad-
missible in a criminal trial); People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710 (Colo. App. 1982);
State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601 (Del. Super. 1985); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 295 (1986) (This case involved a 12-year-old girl
who was kidnapped and murdered, and the only witness to the abduction under-
went hypnosis to refresh recollection. The witness identified the defendant as the
kidnapper, but the hypnotically refreshed testimony was held per se inadmissible
in a criminal trial. The hypnosis was not held to render the witness incompetent
to testify to facts recalled prior to hypnosis.); State v. Moreno, - Haw. -, 709
P.2d 103 (1985); State v. Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, 701 P.2d 909, cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 575 (1985); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983); Common-
wealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); People v. Gonzales, 415
Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982), on reconsideration, 417 Mich. 968, 336 N.W.2d
751 (1983), appeal denied, 424 Mich. 908, 385 N.W.2d 585 (1986); Alsbach v.
Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648
(1981); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255
(1983); Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1246 (1984); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981);
State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984).
65. See State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. at 530, 319 S.E.2d at 186.
66. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
[Vol. 10:311
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extent hypnosis should be used in judicial proceedings.67
The courts followirig the per se rule of inadmissibility rely
upon the standard originally outlined in Frye v. United States.6 8
The court in Frye detailed the general rule that expert testimony
on a new scientific technique can be admitted at trial only when
that technique has "gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs." 9 Under Frye, the results of mechanical
or scientific testing are inadmissible unless the testing attains the
point where experts in the field widely share the opinion that the
results are scientifically reliable and accurate.70 Courts relying on
the Frye standard review the scientific literature and discover that
authorities do not credit hypnosis as a method for retrieving to-
tally accurate recollections. 7' Therefore, courts adopting the per se
inadmissible rule hold that trial courts are not justified in admit-
ting hypnotically refreshed testimony. 72
Courts following the per se rule of inadmissibility reject both
the belief that hypnosis only affects credibility of the subsequent
testimony and not admissibility and the belief that procedural
safeguards can eliminate or adequately decrease problems associ-
ated with hypnosis. 7 By excluding hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony, these courts risk excluding evidence that may be relevant
and probative on some vital issues.
ANALYSIS
In Rock v. Arkansas, the United States Supreme Court held
that Arkansas's evidentiary rule precluding admission of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony violated a criminal defendant's funda-
mental right to present a defense at trial.74 The Court appropri-
ated the procedural safeguards approach after utilizing a balancing
test to determine whether a criminal defendant's hypnotically in-
duced testimony should be excluded or admitted at trial.75 In
reaching its holding, the Court balanced the state's interest in reli-
67. See Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97,, 436 A.2d 170, 177
(1981).
68. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
69. Id. at 1014.
70. See State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
71. See State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. at 530, 319 S.E.2d at 186.
72. Id.
73. See United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1202 (1984).
74. 107 S. Ct. at 2714-15.
75. Id. at 2711-14.
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able testimony against a defendant's constitutional right to testify
on her own behalf at a criminal trial.
The Court acknowledged that problems associated with hyp-
nosis may affect the reliability of subsequent testimony: the hyp-
notic subject, who is suggestible, may attempt to please the hypno-
tist with answers the subject believes will be met with approval;
the subject may confabulate or fill in details from his imagination
in order to make an answer more coherent and complete; and the
subject may experience "memory hardening," which gives him
more confidence in both true and false recollections and renders
cross-examination less efficacious.7 6 Juxtaposed to the state's inter-
est in the reliability of testimony is a criminal defendant's consti-
tutional right to testify in his own behalf. Several provisions of the
Constitution encompass this right.77 The Court noted that a de-
fendant's right to present relevant testimony is not without limita-
tion.78 In certain situations, this right must yield to accommodate
other legitimate interests of the state.79 For example, the accused
must comply with established evidentiary and procedural rules cre-
ated to promote fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of
guilt and innocence.80 A defendant must observe nonarbitrary rules
which disqualify individuals as witnesses when they are incapable
of observing events due to mental infirmities.8 1 However, restric-
tions placed on a defendant's constitutional right to testify must
not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes which the re-
strictions are designed to promote.2 A state must evaluate whether
the purposes served by the rule justify the restrictions imposed on
a defendant's constitutional right to testify in a criminal trial.83
The United States Supreme Court held that Arkansas's per se
inadmissible rule amounted to an arbitrary restriction on a defend-
76. Id. at 2713.
77. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (the sixth amendment
grants to the defendant personally the right to make his defense); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (the fifth amendment grants to a criminal defendant
the privilege to testify in his own defense or refuse to do so); Ferguson v. Georgia,
365 U.S. 570 (1961) (the fourteenth amendment secures a criminal defendant's
right to testify in his own behalf or remain silent).
78. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2711.
79. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
80. Id. at 302.
81. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 n.21 (1967).
82. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2711.
83. Id.
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ant's right to testify."' The Court found that the Arkansas Su-
preme Court neglected to apply the constitutional analysis re-
quired when a defendant's right to testify is at stake.8 5 The state
failed to prove that all hypnotically refreshed testimony is so unre-
liable that an evidentiary rule prohibiting a defendant's hypnoti-
cally induced testimony is justified.8 6 The Court pointed out that
authorities credit hypnosis as a valuable means of obtaining inves-
tigative leads or identifications subsequently corroborated by inde-
pendent evidence . 7  1,
The Court advocated the procedural safeguards approach as
the appropriate approach for lower courts to follow when con-
fronted with the question of the admissibility of a criminal defend-
ant's hypnotically induced testimony.8 The Court suggested that
the following procedures be followed during the hypnotic process
to reduce risks associated with hypnosis: only a psychologist or
psychiatrist with special training in the use of hypnosis should
carry out the hypnotic procedure; the hypnotist should be inde-
pendent of the investigation; the hypnotic process should be per-
formed in a neutral setting with no one but the hypnotist and sub-
ject present; and tape or video recordings should be prepared of all
contact between the hypnotist and subject before, during, and af-
ter hypnosis.89 The Court stated that these guidelines do not guar-
antee accurate recollections but provide a means of controlling
overt suggestions." Furthermore, the procedural safeguards ap-
proach allows a trial judge to utilize his discretion and admit hyp-
notically refreshed testimony in a particular case if he is convinced
84. Id. at 2714-15.
85. Id. at 2712.
86. Id. at 2714.
87. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 533, 453 N.E.2d 484, 488, 466
N.Y.S.2d 255, 259 (1983). In the famous Chowchilla, California, kidnapping case
of 1976, kidnappers abducted twenty-six school children riding on a school bus
and their school bus driver. The bus driver escaped and during hypnosis recalled
a partial license plate number of the abductor's car. The driver had failed to re-
member this number in the waking state. This recollection led to apprehension of
the kidnappers. W. KROGER, CLINICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 116 (1977);
In the airport raid at the Entebbe airport in Uganda, Israeli police used hyp-
nosis to obtain recollections from released victims of the airport's layout and con-
struction prior to carrying out their successful assault. G. AMBROSE, A HANDBOOK
OF MEDICAL HYPNOSIS 19 (1980).
88. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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of the testimony's reliability.
In the Rock dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that he found
no justification in the United States Constitution for the Rock
Court's holding.9 1 However, the United States Supreme Court has
held in previous cases that a defendant has a constitutional right
to testify on his or her own behalf in a criminal trial.9 2 First, the
fourteenth amendment guarantees that no one shall be deprived of
liberty without due process of law. 3 This right encompasses a right
to be heard and offer testimony. 4 Second, the defendant's right to
testify is included in the compulsory process clause of the sixth
amendment.9 5 The defendant's right to testify is logically included
in his right to call witnesses whose testimony is "material and
favorable to his defense."9 " Third, the opportunity to testify is a
necessary corollary to the fifth amendment's guarantee against
compelled testimony. Each criminal defendant holds the right to
testify in his own defense or refuse to do S0.98
In addition, Justice Rehnquist stated that the principles the
Rock Court recognized as underlying a criminal defendant's right
to testify on her own behalf furnished scant support for invalidat-
ing Arkansas's exclusionary rule.99 Justice Rehnquist noted that
one of the justifications for permitting a defendant to testify at
trial was advancement of a trial's truth-seeking function.' How-
ever, he stated that advancement of the truth-seeking function
necessarily precluded Mrs. Rock's hypnotically refreshed
testimony.101
Contrary to Rehnquist's finding, however, Arkansas's per se
rule of inadmissibility virtually prevented Mrs. Rock from describ-
91. Id. at 2715.
92. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (the defendant has the
"ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as
to whether to . . .testify in his or her own behalf"); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605, 612 (1972) ("Whether the defendant is to testify is an important tactical
decision as well as a matter of constitutional right").
93. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
94. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
95. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967).
96. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982).
97. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 230 (1971).
98. Id. at 225.
99. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2715.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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ing any of the events which occurred on the day of the shooting.10 2
For example, Arkansas's rule prohibited Mrs. Rock from testifying
about her husband's activities on the morning of the shooting or
their discussion and argument concerning their move to Mrs.
Rock's trailer,10 3 although witnesses could have corroborated many
of these events.' 0 ' In addition, Arkansas's rule precluded Mrs.
Rock from testifying about the actual shooting beyond the words
contained in Dr. Back's notes taken prior to the hypnotic pro-
cess. 10 5 Arkansas's exclusionary rule hindered any consideration of
the reliability of Mrs. Rock's hypnotically refreshed testimony and
severely thwarted the search for the truth in this case.
Rehnquist's dissent noted that a defendant's right to testify is
subject to reasonable restrictions. 06 However, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court failed to impose reasonable restrictions. The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court avoided the constitutional analysis required
when a defendant's right to testify is at stake and failed to balance
the purpose for precluding such testimony against a defendant's
right to testify. Arkansas's rule amounted to an arbitrary, rather
than a reasonable, restriction.
The factor distinguishing this case from other cases dealing
with the issue of admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony
appears to be that the Court in Rock dealt with the testimony of a
defendant, rather than the testimony of a witness to a crime. In
formulating its holding, the Arkansas Supreme Court relied to a
great extent on the reasoning of the California Supreme Court case
of People v. Shirley.10 7 In Shirley, the court adopted a strict rule
of inadmissibility. 0 8 However, the Shirley court specifically ex-
empted a defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony from its
rule of inadmissibility and stated that it created "this necessary
exception to avoid impairing the fundamental right of an accused
to testify in his own behalf."' 0 9
The Rock Court pointed out that it faced the question of the
admissibility of a defendant's testimony, rather than a witness's
testimony, and refused to determine the same issue for a witness's
102. Id. at 2712.
103. Id. at 2707 n.4.
104. Id. at 2712.
105. Id. at 2707.
106. Id. at 2715-16.
107. Rock v. Arkansas, 708 S.W.2d at 83-84.
108. 31 Cal. 3d at 67, 723 P.2d at 1384, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
109. Id.
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testimony. 10 If the Court in Rock had considered the question of
the admissibility of a witness's testimony, the Court probably
would have reached a different holding because it would not have
applied a balancing test or regarded constitutional considerations
in reaching its conclusion.
In addition, the corroboration of Mrs. Rock's testimony
swayed the Court and led the Court to reach its holding."' After
undergoing hypnosis, Mrs. Rock recalled that at the time of the
shooting she only grasped the gun's hammer; she remembered that
she did not have her finger on the trigger. 1"2 She recalled that the
gun discharged when her husband struck her arm.' 3 A gun expert
examined the gun and concluded that it would discharge if hit or
dropped."4 The Arkansas trial court allowed the gun expert to tes-
tify regarding the gun's defective condition; however, the court
prohibited Mrs. Rock from testifying about her hypnotically re-
freshed recollections that the gun discharged when her husband
struck her arm. " 5 The gun expert's testimony would have been
more significant if the court had allowed the jury to hear Mrs.
Rock's testimony. Instead, Arkansas's rule of inadmissibility pre-
cluded her testimony even when that testimony was highly reliable
as evidenced by corroborative evidence.
Courts adopting a per se rule of inadmissibility often refrain
from making that rule absolute. The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals noted that in a particular case "the evidence favoring admis-
sibility might make the probative value of the testimony outweigh
its prejudicial effect."" 6 The court stated further that if adequate
procedural safeguards have been followed, corroborative post-hyp-
notic testimony might be admissible." 7
By adopting the procedural safeguards approach, the Court in
Rock singled out the correct approach to be followed by trial
courts when faced with the issue of the admissibility of hypnoti-
cally induced testimony. In Rock, Dr. Back prepared tape record-
ings of the hypnotic sessions, which furnished a means of evaluat-
110. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2712 n.15.
111. Id. at 2714.
112. Id. at 2707.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1203.
117. Id.
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ing Dr. Back's hypnotic procedures. 118 After consideration of these
recordings, the trial judge concluded Dr. Back did not suggest re-
sponses with leading questions. 1 9 The gun expert's findings and
testimony corroborated Mrs. Rock's hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony.120 All of these factors provide an argument for the reliability
and admissibility of Mrs. Rock's testimony. However, Arkansas's
per se rule of inadmissibility totally precluded the hypnotically re-
freshed testimony without regard for the reasons for hypnosis, the
circumstances under which it occurred, or any independent corrob-
oration of information it produced." 1 On the other hand, the pro-
cedural safeguards approach allows a trial court to review the cir-
cumstances under which hypnosis took place and independent
verification of information it produced and allows admission of
hypnotically refreshed testimony where it appears reliable.
Procedural safeguards do not guarantee the accuracy of hyp-
notically refreshed testimony; however, as one writer noted, factual
accuracy of testimony is not an inflexible requirement for admissi-
bility. 22 Frequently, eyewitness testimony is factually inaccurate
because of prejudice, misperception, and bias.1 23 However, courts
routinely admit such testimony and rely on procedural safeguards,
such as cross-examination, to reduce the risks of ambiguity, erro-
neous recall, flawed perception, and prevarication." 4 Similarly,
trial courts should admit hypnotically refreshed testimony if the
hypnotist followed adequate procedural safeguards to protect
against unreliability.
The Rock Court's holding furthers the search for the truth and
protects the integrity of the judicial system by encouraging the ad-
mission of reliable testimony at trial. In pursuing the search for
the truth, the law of evidence proceeds on the premise that the
way to discover the truth is to allow the parties to present to the
court or jury all relevant evidence."25 Then, the court or jury may
ascertain the reliability of the evidence, assisted by traditional
118. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2706-07.
119. Id. at 2714.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2712.
122. Spector and Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law
of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 584 (1977).
123. Stewart, Perception, Memory and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law
and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REv. 1.
124. Spector and Foster, supra note 122, at 584.
125. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 184 (3d ed. 1984).
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means of assessing credibility, such as cross-examination, expert
testimony, and cautionary jury instructions. A state court should
not be allowed to adopt an evidentiary rule that precludes a crimi-
nal defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony without looking
at the reasons for the hypnosis, the circumstances under which it
took place, or any independent verification of the information it
produced.12 Such a per se rule of inadmissibility may preclude rel-
evant evidence and thwart the search for the truth.
In State v. McQueen,27 the North Carolina Supreme Court
confronted the issue of the admissibility of a witness's hypnotically
induced testimony and adopted the per se admissible rule.1 28 Prior
to trial, a witness to two murders requested that she be hypnotized
for the purpose of refreshing her recollection of the details sur-
rounding the crimes.129 The witness subsequently testified at trial.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the fact that a wit-
ness is hypnotized prior to trial affected credibility but not admis-
sibility of the witness's testimony and pointed out that the trial
court fully advised the jury of the witness's hypnotic experience.130
In State v. Peoples,1 31 the North Carolina Supreme Court
again faced the issue of the admissibility of a witness's hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony. The Peoples opinion represented the op-
posite end of the spectrum when it held that hypnotically re-
freshed testimony is inadmissible in a judicial setting.1 32 The court
adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility because of problems associ-
ated with hypnosis that may lead to inaccurate subsequent testi-
mony. 33 The court allowed a previously hypnotized witness to tes-
tify as to facts that he or she related prior to hypnosis.13 4 The
Peoples court pointed out that several courts that have adopted a
rule of inadmissibility refuse to make the rule absolute." 5 For ex-
ample, the Fifth Circuit adopted a rule of inadmissibility but ex-
126. See Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2712.
127. 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978).
128. Id. at 119-20, 244 S.E.2d at 427-28.
129. Id. at 119, 244 S.E.2d at 417.
130. Id.
131. 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984). See generally Note, Criminal Pro-
cedure-The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Hypnosis-State v.
Peoples, 7 CAMP. L. REV. 409 (1985).
132. Id. at 531-32, 319 S.E.2d at 187.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 533, 319 S.E.2d at 188.
135. Id. at 531, 319 S.E.2d at 186.
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empted a defendant from this rule because of a defendant's funda-
mental right to testify in his own behalf.136
The North Carolina Supreme Court answered the question of
whether a witness's hypnotically refreshed testimony should be ad-
mitted at trial but failed to answer the same question regarding a
defendant's hypnotically induced testimony. In Peoples, the court
alluded to the admissibility of a defendant's hypnotically refreshed
testimony and intimated that North Carolina would carve out an
exception to its rule of inadmissibility for a defendant's
testimony. 13
7
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court in Rock an-
swered the issue of the admissibility of a defendant's hypnotically
refreshed testimony and encouraged lower courts to undergo a con-
stitutional analysis and adopt the procedural safeguards approach
in such a situation. 8 The Rock court's holding should affect North
Carolina courts in the future when they confront the question of
the admissibility of a defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony
and may influence North Carolina's creation of a necessary excep-
tion to its rule of inadmissibility.
CONCLUSION
Over the course of history, civilizations and tribes used hypno-
sis for medical and therapeutic purposes.3 9 At times, people ac-
cepted hypnosis as a valid practice but at other times rejected it as
an evil power or form of quackery.4 0 Today, the American Medical
Association advocates hypnosis as a valuable therapeutic tech-
nique. 4 1 However, due to risks associated with hypnosis, courts
have wrestled over the past two decades with the question of
whether hypnotically refreshed testimony should be admitted at
trial. Courts have adopted one of three approaches when faced
with this issue, yet no definitive standard emerges.
In Rock v. Arkansas, the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a defendant's hypnotically induced testimony
136. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 67, 641 P.2d 775, 805, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 243, 273.
137. See State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. at 531, 319 S.E.2d at 186-87.
138. See Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2714.
139. Comment, supra note 31, at 765.
140. See Sies, supra note 3, at 81-83.
141. Council on Scientific Affairs: Scientific Status of Refreshing Recollec-
tion by the Use of Hypnosis, supra note 2, at 1918.
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should be admitted or excluded at trial.1 42 The Court balanced a
defendant's constitutional right to testify against unreliability as-
sociated with hypnotically enhanced testimony and adopted the
procedural safeguards approach.14 3 Before Rock, courts dealt with
the issue of the admissibility of a witness's hypnotically refreshed
testimony. The Court in Rock settled the question of the admissi-
bility of a defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony, yet the
court failed to settle this issue in relation to the hypnotically in-
duced testimony of witnesses or victims of a crime.41 Therefore,
the law in this area remains in a state of confusion with no consis-
tent standard to be applied by lower courts.
Audrey Cooper
142. Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. at 2708.
143. Id. at 2714.
144. Id. at 2712, n.15.
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